The Bitter Lake

Abdelrahman Al-Rashed has a new op-ed series in Asharq al-Aawsat that happens to take up the topic of peace agreements with Israel – not long after Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman addressed the same topic (see below). These articles argue against “collective” Arab-Israeli negotiations of the past and highlight the success of “bilateral” agreements – such as (perhaps) the Saudi-Israeli (with an assist from the United States) “mega-deal” that has been the subject of growing media speculation. Rashed almost certainly passes through meetings with senior Saudi officials. As with many op-ed writers, his columns are likely a combination of talking points promoted in these meetings and his own worldview, albeit in a sharply constrained media environment.

In the first op-ed, entitled “Saudi-Israel Negotiations,” we read that:

Peace projects with Israel can be divided into collective and bilateral efforts. Collective projects failed: the Madrid Conference; the Fez Summit initiative, presented by King Fahd and then withdrawn after it was rejected; the Beirut Summit initiative [n.b. “Arab Peace Initiative”], from King Abdullah; which was rejected by Israel; and the “peace for prosperity” project laid out by Jared Kushner, called the “deal of the century,” which was also not achieved.

Yet among the bilateral agreements, almost all of them succeeded in their declared goals: signatories maintained their commitments and they continue to this day… [recounts agreements from Camp David to the Abraham Accords]

What are the goals of the Saudi-Israeli negotiation, if it actually goes ahead?

All bilateral Arab-Israeli agreements were based on a exchange of interests, from Camp David to the last with Bahrain…
the American proposal has been met by multiple Saudi demands that serve its interests. Defense cooperation, which is important for Saudi security, armaments, the nuclear project, and more, while reviving negotiations on a two-state solution. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman spoke to the American media about his desire to enable the Palestinian side to negotiate within Saudi efforts. 

The bilateral negotiations (Saudi-Israeli) will be decided by the two countries. As for the peace negotiations, they will be based on the idea of a Palestinian state and resolution ofoutstanding issues: the refugees, settlements, the capital, and others. These decisions will be in the hands of the Palestinians alone, in their separate course of negotiations. Rapid Palestinian diplomatic action is notable at present, which suggests a desire to benefit from the new [diplomatic] movement. 

The Palestinian Authority was supposed to benefit from other, previous Arab bilateral negotiations with Israel, but it did not do so… 

The Saudi path may not achieve a Palestinian state, but it will create the political climate supportive of that… This is not the time to blame the Palestinian Authority for missed opportunities, nor to rebuke the Arabs for their failure to support the Palestinian people, but rather to look for opportunities to fix the deteriorating conditions, restore the political situation, and stop Palestinian divisions.

Aawsat, 10.1.2023

Rashed’s statements are of course not official Saudi policy, and he has changed his views before along with changes in official talking points. Still, notable takeaways include:

• Criticizing collective peace efforts including the touchstone policy of the Arab Peace Initiative
• Backing away from a commitment to a Palestinian state in favor of a commitment to support negotiations toward a Palestinian state – more or less the position of the U.S. government

Part 2, “Bilateral Relationship with Israel,” (Aawsat, 10.2.2023) draws an implicit comparison between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat salvaging a modicum of success from the failures of Palestinian “resistance” and new efforts to pursue Saudi Arabia’s interests while salvaging some kind of gains for Palestinians. Proposed benefits for Palestinians include:

• Addressing everyday issues like “facilitating air travel and ending the humiliating and exhausting land transportation crisis”
• Economic approaches such as “Turkish trade exchanges, Turkish Airlines [routes], and UAE technical cooperation… as well as searching for ways to strengthen the Palestinian private commercial sector by opening the markets
• Addressing the “long-term political stagnation and economic hardship” that is “behind Hamas’ popularity” and “behind political extremism”
• The hope that the Netanyahu government “will take steps to build confidence, by stopping settlements and the encroachment of Israeli extremists on holy Islamic places”
• Closing with a reminder that “Seeking a comprehensive solution to the conflict through a single project is a difficult, if not impossible, task in the current regional circumstances.”

To drive home the main Saudi concern in present negotiations: “Saudi Arabia, regardless of whether there is a relationship with Israel and Palestinian negotiations or not, is looking for its highest interests with the United States in securing military agreements vital to its security.”

Neither op-ed makes much of a positive case for what Saudi Arabia would gain from Israel per se, focusing more on the U.S. security commitments that Saudi Arabia can gain by agreeing to normalize relations with Israel. (Perhaps this is due to Rashed’s audience, with one fellow Aawsat collumnist referring to Israel as an authoritarian theocracy over the summer).

Contrast this with Rashed’s response in a Hudson Institute Q&A back in 2016, where his main proposal for improving ties is Saudi Arabia offering work permits to Israel’s Arab citizens:

Joseph Braude: Can the two countries increase and deepen human engagement, perhaps as part of an effort to encourage a political resolution?

Rashed: Again, without a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, prospects to do so are severely constrained. A resolution of that conflict, whether along the lines of the “Arab Peace Initiative” presented by the late King Abdullah or some other approach, will make it much easier to improve relations among Saudis, other Arabs, Jews generally, and Israelis.

Update: Rashed was hardly alone (and thanks to a friend for pointing this out).

Khalid al-Malik in Al-Jazirah with a 4-part series on “after normalization”:

1. Informs readers that “the Palestinians squandered all the opportunities that were available” and emphasizes “a new shift, with the Kingdom moving towards normalization with Israel if the American President succeeds in convincing the Israelis to accept the Kingdom’s conditions” (Oct. 4)
2. Criticizes past “rejectionism” & the “3 no’s” (Oct. 5)
3. Recounting the Kingdom’s support for the Palestinian cause and denouncing “obscenities from some Palestinian journalists, writers, and preachers” (Oct. 6)
4. Emphasizing the necessity of normalization for peace in the region (Oct. 8)

Add to this a two-part op-ed by Othman al-Sini in Al-Watan (both parts on Oct. 4) and another from Faisal Abbas for the English-language Arab News on the same day. (Following up on his writing on the same over the summer).

These articles follow Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s recent interview on Fox News, that was highlighted in advance by the Saudi Press Agency. The major takeaways of interview (I’ve transcribed part of it below) can be summed up as:

• Acknowledging negotiations with Israel: “Every day we get closer. It seems, for the first time, a real [deal], a serious [one]. We’re going to see how it goes.”
• Ambivalent commitments to “ease the life of the Palestinians”
• Warning the United States: no security deal could lead to Saudi Arabia “shifting their armaments [purchases] from America to another place” and lead the administration to miss “a historic opportunity”

I haven’t had time to do a full review (to be updated) but even commentators normally quite effusive in their support for MBS appear to have touched on the issue of negotiations with Israel only in passing – if at all. (See update, though).

On the U.S. side of things, it’s hard to overstate how much a handful of senior officials have become truly obsessed with the thought of this deal. Every other month, it seems, Axios reports on Brett McGurk & Amos Hochstein traveling to Saudi Arabia to press for the “mega-deal” yet again. This is no doubt readily apparent to Saudi officials as well – hence the Crown Prince appearing on “opposition” channel Fox News to dangle the prospect of a “historic” deal while also warning of the potential backlash from the Biden administration appearing to “lose” Saudi Arabia[‘s purchases of U.S. weaponry].

Rashed pledges a third article examining the role of Saudi-Iranian relations in all of this; I’ll update this pose when we get it.

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Unofficial Transcript:

BEIER: What would it take for you to normalize relations with Israel?

MBS: Well, there is [an] approach from President Biden’s administration to get to that point. For us, the Palestinian issue is very important. We need to solve that part. And we have good negotiations that continue. Now we’re going to see where it’s going to go. We hope it will reach a place where it will ease the life of the Palestinians and get Israel [back?] as a player in the Middle East.

BEIER: There are reports that you had suspended talks?

MBS: No, no that’s not true.

BEIER:…are you close?

MBS: Every day we get closer. It seems, for the first time, a real one, serious. We’re going to see how it goes.

BEIER: Can you make a deal with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu? Is that somebody you can deal with?

MBS: Well, in Saudi Arabia’s policy, we don’t interfere with who’s running each country who’s there. We work with him. Now we don’t have the relation with Israel. But if the Biden administration succeed to make (I believe) the biggest historical deal since the end of the Cold War, then we’re going to start a relationship. And that relationship [will] continue regardless of who’s running Israel…

BEIER: The concessions Israel would have to give the Palestinians… what would that look like?

MBS: That’s part of the negotiation. I don’t want to describe things, because I want to see the good life for Palestinians…

BEIER: Would there be a defense pact between Saudi Arabia and the United States, and what would that look like? Article 5 and NATO?

MBS: We have some sort of that in the past 80 years. We are the biggest buyer from American arms manufacturing. I believe Saudi Arabia is bigger than the next 5 buyers from America, so… Saudi Arabia is critical to your arms [exports] economically. We have a lot of security & military ties that strengthen the position of Saudi Arabia & the Middle East and the position of America globally. You don’t want that to be shifted, to see Saudi Arabia shifting their armaments from America to another place. That document will strengthen that, strengthen the intererst of America, security interest, military interest, economic interest, and also it would save effort and headache from the Saudi side of not switching to other places.

BEIER: There are many people who wonder why you first normalized relations with Iran, a long-time enemy… but not yet Israel. Can you explain that?

Based on the situation and politics. We have a long fight with Iran since ’79. We don’t want that to be the norm in the Middle East. If there is an opportunity to shift that and to go to prosperity and interest and working with Iran and other Middle Eastern, Arab world and the middle east, why not?… We had a few obstacles, China came in and solved it, and we have a good start [to things]… What we see from the Iranians is that they are taking this very seriously and that they’re doing their best and investing in that.